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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Clifford Daniel Singer timely appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. On appeal, Mr. Singer argues that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for a judgment of acquittal and that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to 
convict him for burglary because there is no evidence in the record indicating that 
Mr. Singer intended to permanently deprive Randy Willette of his property. Mr. Singer 
also argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of burglary 
because there was no evidence indicating that he had the intent to commit the offense 
of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's home. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Singer was renting a room from Mr. Willette and he left Mr. Willette a $250 
rental deposit. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.) 
Mr. Singer decided to move on short notice and asked Mr. Willette to return his deposit. 
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Mr. Willette did not return the deposit, so Mr. Singer decided to take 
some of Mr. Willette's personal property1 as a form of collateral. (PSI, pp.2-3.) After 
Mr. Willette discovere~ that some of his personal property was missing he called the 
police. (PSI, pp.2-3.) 
Mr. Singer was charged, by Information, with burglary. (R., pp.41-42.) The case 
proceeded to a jury trial, and the State provided three witnesses. The first witness, 
Mr. Willette, testified that he was not present in his home when Mr. Singer took his 
1 This property included, among other things, a rain stick, a snare drum, a peacock 
lamp, an antique whiskey jug, and a cougar skull. (PSI, p.3.) 
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property. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.28, L.17 - p.29, L.21 .)2 Mr. Willette testified that Mr. Singer 
called him after he had taken his property and demanded his deposit money. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.24, Ls.1-11.) Mr. Willette returned Mr. Singer's phone call and he left a message 
indicating that he was willing to return Mr. Singer's deposit if Mr. Singer was willing to 
return Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. VoL 11, p.32, Ls.3-10.) 
The State's second witness, Danielle Partyka, who lived with both Mr. Willette 
and Mr. Singer, witnessed Mr. Singer move out of Mr. Willette's home. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.42, 
L.13 - p.44, L.22.) She testified that she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived at 
Mr. Willette's residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.53, Ls.17-25.) Mr. Singer asked Ms. Partyka if 
she knew where Mr. Willette had left his deposit money and she said no. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.54, Ls.1-20.) Ms. Partyka testified that it was after Mr. Singer realized that Mr. Willette 
had not returned his deposit, that he told her he was going to take Mr. Willette's 
property to use as collateral. (Tr. Vol. II, p.54, L.21 - p.55, L.2, p.56, Ls.4-8, p.59, L.22 -
p.60, L.2.) 
The State's third witness, Officer Mortensen, responded to a theft report and met 
Mr. Willette about half a city block from Mr. Singer's knew residence. (Tr. Vol. II, p.63, 
Ls.6-23.) Officer Mortensen then walked over to Mr. Singer's new residence and 
started talking to Mr. Singer. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.64, Ls.5-20.) Mr. Singer candidly told Officer 
Mortensen that he had taken some of Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit 
money. (Tr. Vol. II, p.64, Ls.21-25, p.67, Ls.11-23.) Mr. Singer invited Officer 
Mortensen into his new residence and showed him Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. Vol. II, 
2 There are two volumes of the trial transcript. For ease of citation, this brief will 
reference the volume which contains the court's opening, voir dire, etc . .. , as Volume I. 
The volume with the State's case in chief and the sentencing hearing will be cited to as 
Volume II. 
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p.65, Ls.1-17.) Mr. Singer told Officer Mortensen that he was planning on retuning 
Mr. Willette's property, which he did. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.69, Ls.3-4, p.69, Ls.14-23.) 
After the State rested its case, Mr. Singer moved for a judgment of acquittal, 
arguing that the State did not present any evidence indicating that Mr. Singer intended 
to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property. (Tr. Vol. II, p.73, L.13 - p.74, L.3, 
p.75, Ls.4-21.) The district court denied the motion, reasoning that it was a close issue, 
but to grant the motion it would have to weigh the evidence which it thought was a "jury 
issue." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.75, L.21 - p.76, L.5.) The jury rendered a guilty verdict on the 
offense of burglary. (R., p.110.) Mr. Singer then renewed his motion for judgment of 
acquittal, which he subsequently withdrew. (R., pp.117-118.)3 
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one 
and one-half years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Singer on 
probation. (R., pp.123-127.) 
Mr. Singer timely appealed. (R., pp.135-137.) 
3 Mr. Singer's motion to withdraw his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal and the 
district court's order granting that motion are not currently in the record on appeal. 
Accordingly, a motion to augment his been filed concurrently herewith. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Singer's motion for judgment of acquittal, 
and was there sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer took Mr. Willette's property with the intent to 
permanently deprive Mr. Willette of possession or use of his property and that he had 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Singer's Motion For Judgment Of Ac 1uittal, 
And There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational Juror Could Conclude. 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Mr. Singer Took Mr. Willette's Property With The 
Intent To Permanently Deprive Mr. Willette Of Possession Or Use Of His Property And 
There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational .Juror Could Conclude, Beyond 
A Reasonable Doubt, That ~Ar. Singer Had The Specific Intent To Commit The Offense 
Of Theft When He Entered Mr. Willette's Residence 
A. Introduction 
The State's burglary case was based on the premise that Mr. Singer had the 
specific intent to commit the offense of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's residence. 
To be found guilty of the offense of theft, Mr. Singer must have had the intent to 
permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property. At the jury trial, the State failed to 
provide evidence indicating that Mr. Singer intended to permanently deprive Mr. Willette 
of his property. All of the State's witnesses testified that Mr. Singer was using 
Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit. 
Mr. Singer also argues that there was insufficient evidence from which a rational 
juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer had the specific intent 
to commit the offense of theft when he entered Mr. Willette's residence. The only 
evidence adduced at the jury trial concerning this point was Ms. Partyka's testimony that 
Mr. Singer developed the intent to take Mr. Willette's property after he realized that 
Mr. Willette had not returned the deposit money. 
8. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Singer's Motion For Judgment 
Of Acquittal, And There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational 
Juror Could Conclude, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Singer Took 
Mr. Willette's Property With The Intent To Permanently Deprive Mr. Willette Of 
Possession Or Use Of His Property 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a), a judgment of acquittal shall be entered if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense charged. I.C.R. 29(a). An 
5 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion must be denied if there is substantial and competent 
evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict. State v. Hoilon, 136 Idaho 499, 501 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). Review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal requires the 
appellate court to independently consider the evidence in the record and determine 
whether reasonable minds would conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material 
element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt State v. Erwin, 98 
Idaho 736, 572 P.2d 170 (1977). In making this determination, all reasonable 
inferences are taken in favor of the state. State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 
985 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. State v. 
Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 335 P.3d 31, 34 (2014). An appellate court only inquires 
into "whether there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have 
found that the State met its burden of proving the essential elements of the charged 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at _, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "[T]he Court is required to consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, but will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of 
witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence." Id. at_, 335 P.3d at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that a conviction be supported by legally sufficient evidence. See 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979). Sufficient evidence is "evidence 
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necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of 
every element of the offense." Id. at 316. 
Mr. Singer's conviction for burglary was based on I.C. § 18-1401, which provides, 
"Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane 
or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary." 
LC.§ 18-1401. The offense of theft is codified in I.C. § 18-2401(1), which provides "A 
person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of 
property or to a propriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, 
obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof." I.C. § 18-2401 (1) (emphasis 
added). The district court provided the following jury instruction which mirrors the Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instruction number 562: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The phrase "intent to deprive" means: 
a. The intent to withhold property or cause it to be withheld from an 
owner permanently or for so extended a period or under such 
circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is 
lost to such owner; or 
b. The intent to dispose of the property in such manner or under 
such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such 
property. 
The phrase "intent to appropriate" means: 
a. The intent to exercise control over property, or to aid someone 
other than the owner to exercise control over it, permanently or for so 
extended a period of time or under such circumstances as to acquire the 
major portion of its economic value or benefit; or 
b. The intent to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or 
someone other than the owner. 
(R., p.107.) 
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In this case, there is insufficient evidence to support Mr. Singer's conviction for 
burglary, because there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have found 
that the State met its burden of proving that he intended to permanently deprive 
Mr. Willette of his property. All of the evidence adduced at trial indicated that Mr. Singer 
was temporarily holding Mr. Willette's property until Mr. Willette reimbursed Mr. Singer 
his deposit of $250. Mr. Willette testified that Mr. Singer called him after he had taken 
the property. (Tr., Vol. II, p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.2.) Mr. Willette also testified that he 
returned Mr. Singer's call and left a message indicating that he would return 
Mr. Singer's deposit money if Mr. Singer would return Mr. Willette's property. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.32, Ls.3-10.) While he was never informed about a specific date, Mr. Willette knew 
that Mr. Singer was planning on moving to a new residence before he actually moved. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.22, L.19 - p.23, L.6.) Mr. Willette also knew where to find Mr. Singer and 
his property, after Mr. Singer moved. (Tr., Vol. 11, p.32, Ls.16-25.) In fact, Mr. Willette's 
property was returned shortly after Mr. Singer was contacted by Officer Mortensen. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.69, Ls.14-23.) Mr. Singer's behavior with Mr. Willette on the day of the 
offense indicates he intended to return Mr. Willette's property. 
Additionally, the only witness who observed Mr. Singer remove some of 
Mr. Willette's property testified the Mr. Singer intended to return the property to 
Mr. Willette. Mr. Partyka testified that she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived 
at Mr. Willette's residence. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.53, Ls.20-25.) When Mr. Singer contacted 
Ms. Partyka he first asked her if she knew where Mr. Willette left his deposit money. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.54, Ls.1-16.) Ms. Partyka said she did not know where it was and she 
testified that it was at that point when Mr. Singer "told me that he was going to steal 
Randy's karaoke machine because the money was not there." (Tr. Vol. II, p.54, Ls.21-
8 
24.) When asked if Mr. Singer was taking Mr. Willette's belongs ·'as collateral," 
Ms. Partyka said, "Pretty much, yeah." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.55, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Singer's 
defense counsel asked if he actually declared that he was taking the items for collateral 
Ms. Partyka testified, "Well, when he first told me because the deposit wasn't there, it 
was like he was going to take his karaoke machine because he didn't get his deposit 
back when he asked for it. But proceeded to not even take that. He was taking other 
items." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.56, Ls.3-8.) On redirect, the State asked Ms. Partyka to clarify if 
Mr. Singer said he was taking the items as collateral or stealing them. (Tr. Vol. II, p.59, 
Ls.20-25.) Ms. Partyka testified, "He told me he was going to steal it, but [I thought he] 
was taking it as collateral. ... " (Tr. Vol. II, p.60, Ls.1-2.) This evidence indicates that 
Mr. Singer intended to take temporary procession of Mr. Willette's property and that he 
planned to return the property after he received his deposit money. 
Mr. Singer's behavior and statements to Officer Mortensen, indicated that 
Mr. Singer did not intend to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his property. When 
Mr. Singer was contacted by Officer Mortensen, he "admitted that he took the items 
over a dispute of having his deposit returned. of $250 from Randy Willette." (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.64, Ls.21-25.) Officer Mortensen testified, "Clifford invited me in to show me where 
the items were. The peacock lamp and the drum were inside the back seat of the car. 
And then he took me up to his bedroom and showed me the rest of the items." (Tr. Vol. 
II, p.65, Ls.1-8.) When Officer Mortensen was asked if Mr. Singer had taken the items 
as collateral until Mr. Willette returned the deposit, Officer Mortensen testified, "That 
was my understanding, yes." (Tr. Vol. 11, p.67, Ls.20-23.) The following dialogue 
occurred at trial: 
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Q: Okay, Mr. Singer actually told you that he was in the middle of 
loading the property up into that vehicle at that point; is that 
correct? 
A: I don't remember that specifically, but he did mention that he 
planned on retuning it 
Q: And that he was under the belief that Randy was going to return 
the deposit money with the return of the items. Did he tell you that 
as well? 
A: Something along those lines. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.68, L.25 - p.69, L.8.} 
Officer Mortensen also testified that Mr. Singer was cooperative, invited him into 
Mr. Singer house, took him upstairs to his bedroom, and answered all of his questions. 
(Tr. Vol. 11, p.68, Ls.4-14.) This also indicates that Mr. Singer intended to return 
Mr. Willette's property. 
Moreover, Mr. Willette quickly recovered all of his items after Officer Mortensen 
contacted Mr. Singer. The following dialogue occurred between Mr. Singer's defense 
counsel and Officer Mortensen: 
Q: And you were able to summons [Mr. Willette] to [Mr. Singer's] 
residence at some point; is that correct? 
A: Yeah. I was able to just quickly walk to him and say, "Let's get your 
stuff." 
Q: And he was able to regain possession on the items? 
A: He was. 
Q: And as far as you're aware, that property was returned at that time; 
right? 
A: To my knowledge, yes. 
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(Tr. Vol. II, p.69, Ls.14-23.) As such, Mr. Singer did not do anything around Officer 
Mortensen which would indicate that he intended to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of 
his property. 
After Mr. Singer realized that Mr. Willette had not returned his deposit he took 
some of Mr. Willette's property as collateral for his deposit. Mr. Singer then cailed 
Mr. Willette and left a message on his phone. Mr. Willette then called Mr. Singer and 
left a message indicating that he would return the deposit money if Mr. Singer would 
return the property. The only witness who observed Mr. Singer taking Mr. Willette's 
property, Ms. Partyka, testified that Mr. Singer temporarily took the property with the 
intent to return it to Mr. Willette. Officer Mortensen's testimony was consistent with the 
foregoing. There was no evidence in the record which a reasonable jury could use as 
the basis for the conclusion that Mr. Singer had the intent to permanently deprive 
Mr. Willette of his property. It follows that the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Singer's motion for a judgment of acquittal and that there was insufficient evidence 
to conclude that Mr. Singer had the intent to permanently deprive Mr. Willette of his 
property. 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence From Which A Rational Juror Could Conclude, 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Mr. Singer Had The Specific Intent To 
Commit The Offense Of Theft When He Entered Mr. Willette's Residence 
The standards controlling a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence were set 
forth in Section IB, supra, and are incorporated herein. 
Mr. Singer's conviction for burglary was based on I.C. § 18-1401, which provides, 
"Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane 
or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary." 
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I.C. § 18-1401. Mr. Singer developed the intent to hold the property as collateral after 
his initial entry into Mr. Willette's residence. The only testimony as to Mr. Singer's intent 
when he entered Mr. Willette's home was provided by Ms. Partyka. She testified that 
she was in her bedroom when Mr. Singer arrived at Mr. Willette's residence. (Tr. VoL II, 
p.53, Ls.17-25.) While Ms. Partyka was in her bedroom, Mr. Singer asked Ms. Partyka 
if she knew where Mr. Willette had left his deposit money and she said no. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.54, Ls.1-20.) Ms. Partyka testified that it was at that point in time when Mr. Singer 
said he was going to take Mr. Willette's karaoke machine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.45, Ls.21-24.) 
This statement was made to Ms. Partyka before Mr. Singer started moving property out 
of Mr. Willette's home. (Tr. Vol. II, p.44, Ls.7-16, p.45, L.6 ·· p.46, L.2.) Ms. Partyka 
then took a shower and after her shower she noticed that some of Mr. Willette's 
property had been removed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.46, L. 7 - p.47, L.15.) However, Ms. Partyka 
testified that Mr. Singer did not take Mr. Willette's karaoke machine. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.54, 
L.24 - p.55, L.5, p.56, Ls.4-8.) 
There are two points which can be adduced from the testimony of Ms. Partyka. 
First, Mr. Singer did not say he was going to take Mr. Willette's property until he 
confirmed with Ms. Partyka that Mr. Willette did not return his deposit. Since Mr. Singer 
had this discussion near Ms. Partyka's bedroom he was already inside Mr. Willette's 
home when he developed the intent to take Mr. Willette's property. Second, Mr. Singer 
did not have a predetermined plan because he initially told Ms. Partyka that he was 
going to take Mr. Willette's Karaoke machine, but then took different items. This is an 
indicator that Mr. Singer was making hasty decisions after he had already entered the 
residence without the requisite intent. 
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In sum, the evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Singer first decided to take 
Mr. Wiilette's property after he learned that Mr. Willette did not return the deposit. Since 
Mr. Singer was speaking with Ms. Partyka while she was in her bedroom, this decision 
was made after Mr. Singer had entered Mr. Willette's home. It follows that Mr. Singer 
did not have the intent to commit the offense of theft before he entered Mr. Willette's 
property and, therefore, there was no evidence from which a rational juror could 
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Singer was guilty of the offense of 
burglary. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Singer respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for burglary 
and remand this case to the district court. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2015 . 
. ) ·i·,. .,.,--. 
.:::}~~:-t-___ {< ~-"'---~· .l~.&-/,,\ 
SHAWN F. WILK ~ON 
Deputy State Appell'ate Public Defender 
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